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THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS
Matthew A. Coles*
I.

INTRODUCTION:

THE BASIC ARGUMENT.

The United States should have laws protecting the civil rights of lesbians and gay men because the social structures which are supposed to make
sure that people are treated fairly do not protect gay people.
For the most part, America relies on social norms, not law, to ensure
that people are treated fairly. The idea is not simply that people should be
committed to fairness (although that is an important part of the theory),
but that those people who are consistently unfair will fail. Business people,
for example, who base employment decisions on something other than
merit will suffer inasmuch as they will be less efficient than others. A similar fate will befall landlords who are arbitrary about tenants and business
people who are arbitrary about customers. America, generally, does not
have laws requiring "good cause" in employment, housing, etc. because
such laws are thought to be unnecessary.
This may or may not be a wise theory; it may or may not be a relatively
accurate description of how American society actually works. Sometimes at
least, this model of society is neither wise in theory nor accurate in reality.
Sometimes, groups of people suffer for reasons that have nothing to do
with merit or ability, and the system does not correct that.
The purpose of civil rights law' is to step in where society fails. Civil
rights laws are appropriate whenever society consistently disadvantages a
group of people for reasons that are not related to ability. Since gay people have been, and continue to be, the victims of irrational discrimination,
they ought to be protected by civil rights law.
II.

THE PURPOSE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAw.

The basic premise of the American system is that a person's achievement ought to depend on her or his ability and willingness to work. What a
person "gets" ought to depend on individual merit. Although this idea is
central to American law, it is an old idea. It animated the framers of the
* B.A., Yale University, 1973; J.D., University of California, Hastings College of Law,
1977. Mr. Coles is a staffattorney for the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the University of California, Hastings College of
Law.

1. This essay uses the general term "civil rights law" to include constitutional law, legislative law, and court made common law and case law. Although the justification for the adoption of a particular civil rights law or decision may differ in some details depending on the
institution involved and the type of law sought, the general justification for civil rights law is
the same for all.
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Constitution, who wanted to design a government which would protect the
ability of individuals to exercise their "natural faculties." The framers
thought this protection was the "first object" of government. If protected,
2
these "natural faculties" would determine what a person achieved.
Providing the necessary protection, however, presented something of
a dilemma. On the one hand, restraint of the government was essential.
Government had to be structured in a way that would keep one group of
citizens from using it to prevent the members of another from realizing
3
their potential.
Restraint of government would have been all that was necessary if, free
from government interference, society would always reward on the basis of
merit. The framers did not think it necessarily would, so the government
had to have the power to step in and protect citizens from non-governmen4
tal oppression by other citizens.
The solution, according to James Madison, was in a large republic with
governmental power separated among several branches. Representative
government, consisting of leaders who could not exempt themselves from
the laws and who had to face election, would keep the majority from being
5
oppressed by a minority.
The trickier problem of minority oppression would be solved by the
size and diversity of the republic. A large nation would have so many different groups of citizens with such a great variety of interests that it would
be unlikely that a majority would come together to oppress one group.
Even if it were possible, the diversity other interests would make a coalition
to oppress unlikely. As an added check, power would be divided so that
many agencies would have to agree before oppressive action could actually
6
be taken.
Diversity was also the key to a national government which would act
positively to protect minority rights. Since no group of citizens would constitute a majority, each group, sensitive to its own vulnerability as a minority, would support a government aimed at protecting the weak. Madison
said this was the only goal on which an enduring majority coalition would
2. For examples of recent expressions of the idea, see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson 411
U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). On
the thinking of the framers, see THE FEDERALIST, No. 10 (J. MADISON); R. HOFSTADTER, THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION VINTAGE, 14-15, 20 (1973).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (1. Madison). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).
4. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 14-15, 20; THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison);
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (1. Madison). See generally C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1941).
5. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 2. See also R. DAHL, A PREFACE To DEMOCRATIC THEORY 16 (1956).
6. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 2; THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 3. See

also R. DAHL, supra note 5, at 15-16.
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be possible.
In this "pluralized" system, the many minorities that make up society
form temporary alliances to protect each others' interests. Two groups
may join on a single issue to protect a shared interest. Two groups may
join on an issue of great importance to one with little or no importance to a
second group as long as the first group agrees to support the second on an
issue important to it. The coalitions are temporary because there is no
overriding identity of interests.
Groups are protected from oppression by the temporary nature of all
alliances. Concerted action against a minority is impossible because there
is no enduring majority. Groups are also protected by interests they share
with other groups. While a particular group might be on the losing end of
a political contest today, other groups will not oppress it because they recand that its supognize that they may share other interests with the group
8
port may be critical to protecting them in the future.
The pluralized Madisonian system failed to account for a powerful
emotion which leads people to refuse to deal with others with whom they
share interests and which causes people to unite with others with whom
they share nothing, i.e., prejudice. 9 Prejudice against a particular minority
prevents others from seeing that they share interests with the minority.
Since others will not join with the minority even when there are shared
interests, the minority is "frozen out" of the pluralistic process. It can not
protect itself because other groups will not join in "mutual defense pacts"
with it. And a minority suffering from prejudice needs protection because
prejudice can form the basis of an enduring majority bent on harming a
minority. 1o
Civil rights law is aimed at curing the Madisonian system's inability to
deal with prejudice. Generally, civil rights law directs individuals and institutions not to use a person's membership in a group as a basis for action;
e.g., one may not refuse to hire or rent because of a person's race or
gender.
Moreover, civil rights laws do not address the crux of the problem,
political isolation (most likely because prejudice is a complex beast, and
social cures are notoriously ineffective). Instead, current legislation focuses
on the effects prejudice may have on the manner in which the system oper7. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 3; C. BEARD, supra note 4, at 159-161.
8. SeeJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 79-82, 151 (1980); R. DAHL, supra note 5, at 135,

150.
9. While I'm not sure that a definition of prejudice is either wise or necessary (just as I
would decline any invitation to define love), my editors do. I offer this. As used here, "prejudice" means the powerful dislike of all those who possess a trait not in itself harmful to those
who harbor the hate.
10. See United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n. 4 (1938). See also Goodman, Defacto School Segregation: A Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275, 313
(1972).
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ates; while a protected minority may remain unable to protect itself, government and society should be unable to take advantage of that
vulnerability. ' I
The legitimacy of a group's claim to the protection of civil rights law
depends on whether the Madisonian system has failed it. Simply losing a
single political contest will not do as there is a loser on every issue decided
by majority vote. Conversely, an enduring history of losing or more particularly, an enduring history of being disadvantaged because of group membership, is strong evidence that a group cannot protect itself within the
system. That a group has been disadvantaged, however, is simply an insufficient basis on which to invoke protection, as that disadvantage could be
the result of something other than prejudice. There must also be evidence
of hostility, or some dislike which is not merited by any harm the group has
caused or threatened. While there may be direct evidence of this on occasion, it will more typically become evident in society's inability to rationally
explain the disabilities placed on certain groups. For example, if society
says that the members of a certain group are barred from a particular job,
the inability to show that the group's members either cannot perform the
job, or will threaten some legitimate social goal if they do perform the job,
12
is compelling evidence that the "job rule" is based on prejudice.
III.

LESBIANS AND GAY MEN AS A GROUP SHOULD BE PROTECTED
BY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW.

The hallmarks of a group in need of civil rights protection are the
following:
1. a history of having been disadvantaged by society; and
2. evidence that when society disadvantages the group, it is not because of the group's incapability or because the group is dangerous.
Lesbians and gay men meet both of these criteria.13
11. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 1981). See the United States' greatest civil rights
law, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. I am
not so naive as to think that civil rights law in fact prevents either government or private
institutions from disadvantaging minorities. However, that is the aim. A debate about effectiveness is beyond the scope of this essay.
12. This approach uses evidence that society is not allowing people to achieve what they
are capable of as proof that the pluralistic system has failed and that a civil rights law is appropriate. A more direct solution might be to simply adopt an across the board "merit" law; e.g.,
a law banning discharges or evictions, etc., without "cause." Whatever sense that may make,
it is not the way America has chosen to preserve its "merit" system.
13. This essay relies heavily on opinions of appellate courts to show both the existence of
discrimination and many of the justifications commonly offered. The essay relies heavily on
scientific papers to show that those justifications are baseless. Both of these sources need a
bit of explanation.
This essay relies on appellate court opinions for two reasons. First, appellate decisions
usually come after at least some testing of claims about what did or did not happen. Courts
may be sorry sources of ultimate truth, but the accounts they provide are probably more
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Employment Discrimination.

A job is one of the single most important things a person can have in
this society. It is not just the way people support themselves; it is critical to
the way people define themselves and the way they are defined by society.
14
Lesbians and gay men have lost or been denied jobs as librarians,
5
6
7
telephone operators,1 budget analysts,' and police officers.1 Until relatively recently, they were bared from federal employment.18 They remain
barred from the military, 19 and while not denied security clearances outright, lesbians and gay men are subjected to lengthy special investigations
that make employment in many high technology jobs impossible. 20 Gay
21
people have even been denied admission to the bar.
Gay teachers have had a particularly difficult time. They have been
fired for being open about their sexuality with co-workers, 2 2 and for concealing their sexuality from their employers. 23 They have also been fired
reliable than the anecdotes typically used for policy making about sexual orientation. Second,
since courts tend to justify their policy choices explicitly, they are a good source ofjustifications (provided one keeps the proverbial grain of salt within easy reach).
The medical and behavioral materials show that mainstream scientific thinking overwhelmingly rejects the justifications usually offered for discrimination. But I do not offer
these materials to show that. When society chooses to disadvantage a group of people and
defines the group not directly by any trait which can be said to be harmful to others (like
espionage) but rather by some trait (for example, race) which is thought to correlate highly
with a harmful behavior (i.e., many, perhaps most Japanese people on the West Coast will
engage in espionage) it is society's burden to show that all or most who have the trait have or
will engage in the harmful behavior. It is not the responsibility of the group defined by the
trait to show that it will not. To make the connection, society must have the support of most
of those who and think about the behavior in question and the group's relation to it. It must
be "most" of those who have studied the behavior because any claimed relationship between
a trait and a behavior could be justified if only some support were required-one can always
find one or two who will take a certain position no matter how far on the fringe.
Since the scientific rejection of the justifications for sexual orientation discrimination is so
overwhelming, you need not accept my view of society's burden to accept the arguments
made in this essay. But you will view the scientific materials offered differently if you do
accept it.
14. See McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1977).
15. See Gay Law Students v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592 (1979).
16. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (1969).
17. See Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,362 (N.D. Tex.
1981).
18. INTERIM REPORT: EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GovERNMENT, S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950). See alsoJ. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 40-46 (1983).
19. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Watkins v. United States
Army, 837 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1988).
20. See High Tech Gays v. DISCO, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1364-66 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
21. See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners v. Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978); Florida Bd. of
Bar Examiners v. NRS, 403 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981).
22. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
23. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498, 499 (4th Cir. 1974).
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for "socializing" with other gay people away from work. 24
The teacher cases illustrate a startling fact about gay people who get
fired: employers almost never claim that gay people cannot do the job.
Instead, they try to justify discriminating against people by claiming:
1. that gay people are immoral and thus unfit to work;
2. that gay people are mentally unbalanced; and
3. that gay people disturb the workplace because co-workers and
25
others do not like them.
1.

Immorality.

The "immorality" argument usually covers two distinct ideas:
1. that being gay goes against some basic natural law of life on earth;
or
2. that being gay goes against God's law.
A. The "laws of nature" argument. The first stand of this argument says
that it is unnatural to be gay because same sex sexual behavior does not
occur among non-human species. This is simply wrong. Same sex sexual
activity, including the formation of same gender "couples," exists in count26
less other species, both in the wild and in captivity.
More to the point, this argument would condemn as "unnatural"
everything that distinguishes human beings from other life forms. 2 7 Even
those who condemn gay people as unnatural are, for the most part, not
ready to condemn the use of sophisticated logic and a written language.
A second form of this argument holds that being gay must violate the
laws of nature because historically it has been condemned universally by
either all cultures, all religions or both. 28 Again, this is simply wrong. Gay
sexuality has not been universally condemned, either by all religions or all
29
cultures.
But again, the best answer to this argument is that if the historic agreement of most moral and social leaders is proof of immortality then it is (or
at least it was) immoral to think that the earth is round, that it revolves
24. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 292, 559 P.2d 1340, 1346
(1977).
25. See, e.g., id. 88 Wash. 2d at 286; McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1977);
Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,362 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Belier
v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
26. C. FORD & F. BEACH, PATrERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, 139-43, 257-59 (1951); FemaleFemale Pairingin Western Gulls in Southern California, 196 SCIENCE 81-83 (1973). See generally W.
CHURCHILL, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES: A CROSS-CULTURAL AND CROSS SPECIES

INVESTIGATION (1967).
27.

SeeJ. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY:

IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING

GAY PEOPLE

OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CEN-

TURY (1980).
28. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

29. SeeJ.

BOSWELL,

supra note 27.
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around the sun, that blacks are human and that women are capable of work
30
that requires thought.
Sometimes, this argument simply comes down to the notion that being
gay is wrong because society as a whole disapproves of it. All this really
says is that gay people are unpopular. It has nothing to do with whether a
gay person is capable of doing ajob, or whether she or he represents some
real threat to the personal integrity of others.
Recently, some have said that the "right" of nongay people not to associate with lesbians and gay men ought to outweigh the "right" of gay
people to be free of discrimination. That argument is directed at the question of whether other values are more important than civil rights (see below, sec. 4c). It says nothing about whether gay people "merit" a
particular form of discrimination.
B. God's Law. Put aside the fact that those who think they know
God's law are far from agreement on the morality of being gay. Put aside
the fact that even in those parts of the Christian church which find being
gay immoral the idea is, in the Christian scheme of things, relatively recent. 3 ' That a group of people believe that God disapproves of another
group of people is simply not a sufficient proof that the second group of
people is a danger to the first. If it were, we would have to accept the idea
that slavery was justified by the threat blacks posed to whites. Absent some
evidence of incapacity or potential harm, the invocation of God's law, no
matter how devout the belief in it, is no different than the invocation of
historic consensuses or current unpopularity. It is an attempt to deflect the
inquiry from the tangible to the nonexaminable.
2.

Mental Instability

The fascinating thing about this argument is that typically, those
against whom it is used have shown no instability at all; on the contrary,
they are often recognized as model workers. 3 2 Furthermore, virtually
every respectable mental health professional has rejected the claim that as
33
a rule, gay people are less mentally stable than others.
30. I see no need to provide references to these great "truths." For a good example of
the dangers of relying on scientific authority, see GOULD, ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY (1977).

(Before you think me inconsistent for making this reference, see supra, note 12).
31.

SeeJ. BOSWELL, supra note 27.

32. See, e.g., Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340
(1977) (Dolliver, dissenting); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
33. See Gonsiorek, Results ofPsychological Testing on Homosexual Populations, HOMOSEXUALITY:
SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES (1982); Hart, Roback, Tittler, Weitz, Walston

& McKee, Psychological Adjustment of Nonpatient Homosexuals: CriticalReview of the Research Literature, 39J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 604 (1978). See also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 261-83 (3rd ed. 1980); RESOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSN. (1975); RESOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N (1973); and

see M. FREEDMAN, HOMOSEXUALITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING (1971).
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Dislike of Coworkers

Peace in the workplace is the theme of this justification. If gay people
are present, so the argument goes, co-workers will become uncomfortable
34
and efficiency will suffer.
Like the argument about mental instability, this claim is rarely supported with real evidence of controversy in the workplace. However, even
if the argument was supported by evidence, the dislike of co-workers is
simply an employer-specific version of the argument that discrimination is
justified because people do not like lesbians and gay men. The argument
has nothing to do with the capabilities of gay people.
B.

Personal Relationships

Personal relationships are every bit as important as work. However,
America makes personal relationships of all kinds very difficult for lesbians
and gay men.
For example, in many states it is illegal for two persons of the same
gender to have sexual relations, while at the same time, the same conduct
35
is legal if done by heterosexuals.
Gay people cannot marry. 36 They cannot form common law marriages. 3 7 Attempts by gay people to formalize relationships privately are
apt to get less respect from the law than similar heterosexual relationships. 3 8 While the law sometimes allows unmarried heterosexual couples
the benefits of marriage, those benefits are almost never extended to gay
couples.

39

Courts have forced gay parents to choose between their lovers and
their children, conditioning custody and visitation on the absence of a
lover from the parent's home-and in some cases, on the absence of anyone of the same gender.40 While the law says that child custody and visitation are always to be controlled by the "best interests of the child," gay
parents have lost custody even though all the evidence showed separation
34. See, e.g., Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,362 (N.D.
Tex. 1981); Burton v. Cascade School District, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975); Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
35. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1987); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1987).
36. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4100 (West 1988); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191
N.W.2d 185 (1971);Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Singer v. Hara,
11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
37. See, e.g., DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
38. Compare Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106 (1976) withJones v. Daly, 122
Cal. App. 3d 500 (1981).
39. Compare MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 37 Cal. 3d 205, 689 P.2d 453
(1984) with Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269 (1988).
40. See, e.g., In reJ.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d 90 (1974); In rejean B., 85 Misc.
2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1976); A. v. A., 15 Ore. App. 353, 544 P.2d 358 (1973).
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was not in the child's interest. 4 1
Most of these policies are justified with the same "morality" arguments described above. Bans on formalizing gay relationships are alsojustified with these arguments:
1. gay people are unable to form meaningful relationships;
2. gay relationships are a threat to the traditional family. Orders separating gay people from their children use all of these and two
more:
a. the children of gay parents will turn out to be gay;
b. the children of gay parents will be psychologically damaged
by the stigma society attaches to the parents. Like the "morality" arguments, none of these will stand a close look.
1. Inability to Form Relationships.
It is simply not true. Lesbians and gay men do form strong, enduring
42
relationships.
It would hardly be necessary to keep gay people from formalizing long
term relationships if they were incapable of forming them. The bans on
same sex marriage are "needed" only because this argument is simply
43
wrong.
2.

Threat to the family.

If the idea is that people will not enter traditional families if the option
to live in a gay relationship is open, the family is indeed in trouble; nothing
will save it. Occasionally, it is said that gay people will "recruit" children,
or subject them to sexual assault, and are a threat to the family in the that
sense. Almost all adults who become sexually involved with minors are
heterosexual men.

44

41. See Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985). See also S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875
(Alaska 1985).
42. See generally A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY
AMONG MEN AND WOMEN (1978); P. BLUMENSTEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES (1983);
Peplau & Amaro, UnderstandingLesbian Relationships, HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES (1982).
43. This same strange argument-that a group of people cannot form stable relationships and therefore should be prohibited from formalizing such relationships-is used against
despised minorities all the time. See, e.g., R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1977) (blacks). See also
A. HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (1929) (Jews). Its history ought to make one hesitant to give it any
credibility at all.
44. See Sam Houston State Univ., Criminal Justice Center, Responding to Child Sexual Abuse:
A Report to the 67th Session of the Texas Legislature (1980) (cited in Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp.
1121, 1130 (1982), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). See also American Humane Ass'n, Children's Division, Protecting the Child Victim of Sex Crimes Committed By Adults (1969). Why is it that
society so often focuses on the comparatively rare problem of sexual assault by lesbians and
gay men, and pays so much less attention to the serious problem of sexual assault on girls by
heterosexual men?
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Sometimes people say that since gay people do not conform to traditional gender "roles", they are a threat to the family. Apparently, this idea
begins with the notion that gay men are in general "feminine" and lesbians
are "masculine." The presence of masculine women and feminine men in
families, or even in the same society with families will destroy the family,
the argument goes, because children who see feminine men and masculine
women will not learn how to be feminine women and masculine men.
Since they will not learn that, they will be unable to learn how to be good
mothers and good fathers, therefore the family will collapse.
This is nonsense on a grand scale. To begin with, it is not true that
gay women tend to be any less feminine than heterosexual women, or that
gay men tend to be less masculine. 4 5 But more important, there is not a
shred of evidence that growing up in the company of "strong" women or
"gentle" men makes it more likely that girls will be strong and boys gentle.
And, perhaps most important of all, there is no evidence that strong women make bad mothers or that gentle men make bad fathers. Indeed, I
46
suspect the experience of most people is to the contrary.
3.

The Children of Gay People Will Tend to be Gay.

This argument starts off by assuming what it is used to prove: that it is
not good to be gay. In any event, the evidence shows that it is quite false;
children of gay parents are no different that the children of heterosexual
47
parents.
IV.

SOCIETY WILL STIGMATIZE THE CHILDREN OF GAY PARENTS.

Like the arguments about "societal" and "co-worker" disapproval, this
argument says that the bad thing about being gay is that other people do
not like it. Whatever one thinks about this in general, it is certainly not
proof that gay people are less able or worthy, as parents or in any other
way.
The information we have suggests only rarely does society (including
other children) stigmatize the children of gay parents, and that when it
48
happens, the children are not usually hurt by it.
45. Simon & Gagnon, Femininity in the Lesbian Community, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE AND SEXUAL
256-67 (E. Goode & R. Troiden eds. 1974).
46. I have assumed that strength and gentility, the strongest stereotypes associated with
masculinity and femininity, are what those who advance this argument have in mind. Each of
the points applies as well if the idea that gruff language in women or silibant pronunciation by
men is the threat.
47. Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual of Transsexual Parents, 135 AM.
J. PSYCHOLOGY, 692-697 (1979). See also M. KIRKPATRICK, K. SMITH, R. Roy, ADJUSTMENT AND
SEXUAL IDENTITY OF CHILDREN OF LESBIAN AND HETEROSEXUAL SINGLE MOTHERS, (American
Psychiatric Association) (1979); R. REES, A COMPARISON OF CHILDREN OF LESBIAN AND SINGLE
HETEROSEXUAL MOTHERS ON THREE MEASURES OF SOCIALIZATION (1979).
48. See Miller, Gay Fathers and Their Children, 26 FAMILY COORDINATOR 544 (1979); Green,
DEVIANTS
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C. Double Standards
Gay people are told not to dance with each other, not to eat together
in private booths, not to "hangout" in bars, not to hug each other, and not
to go to the prom together. 49 Gay men have been arrested for making
passes at men and convicted by courts which said (incredibly) that straight
men do not make passes at women and by courts which went on to rule
50
public sex is legal when it involves heterosexuals.
Gay people have lost their homes, as have straight people who associated with gay people. 5 1 Gay organizations have been told that they cannot
incorporate. 52 Gay groups have been told, in the finest tradition of unintentional government irony, not to take part in the bicentennial of the
American Revolution. 53 The arguments for all of these are the same: morality and general social dislike for gay people.
Discrimination against lesbians and gay men runs throughout American society. It has a long history. The explanations offered to justify it rely
on things everybody "knows" but which nobody ever tries to provethings which, when tested, never prove to be true. There ought to be a
body of civil rights law protecting lesbians and gay men.
V.

THREE ARGUMENTS AGAINST CIVIL RIGHTS FOR LESBIANS AND GAY
MEN.

A.

Sexual Orientation is Neither Immutable nor Uncontrollable.

There is no point in getting into the argument about whether sexual
Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual of Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
692, 695 (1978).
49. See Morell v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 204 Cal. App. 2d 504, 22
Cal. Rptr. 405, 406 (1962); Stouman v. Munro, 219 Cal. App. 2d 302, 33 Cal. Rptr. 305, 307
(1963); Rolon v. Kulwitzsky 153 Cal. App. 3d 288, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1984); Stoumen v.
Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 715, 222 P.2d 678, 682 (1950), rev'd, 234 P.2d 969, 970 (Sup. Ct.
1951); Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 313, 334 P.2d 294
(Dist. Ct. App.), rev'd, 343 P.2d 54 (Dist. Ct. App.), vacated, 1 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980).
50. Compare the trial court opinion in People v. Uplinger, 111 Misc. 2d 403, 444 N.Y.S.2d
373 (N.Y. Ct. 1981) aff'd, 449 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Erie County Ct. 1982) rev'd, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 460
N.Y.S.2d 514, 447 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982), cert. granted, 464 U.S. 812 (1983), cert.
dismissed, 467 U.S. 247 (1984) with (the same judge's opinion in) People v. Butler, 110 Misc. 2d
843, 443 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (N.Y. City Ct. 1981). See also People v. Rodgriquez, 63 Cal. App. 3d
Supp. 15 (1974).
51. See 420 East 80th Co. v. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d 195, 455 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1982), aff'd, 97
A.D.2d 390, 468 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d
Supp. 1, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1982).
52. See Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 66 Misc. 2d 456, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct.
1971), rev'd sub nom. Owles v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 341 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973); State ex rel.
Grant v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 313 N.E.2d 847 (1974), cert. dismissed sub nom., Duggars v.
Brown, 420 U.S. 916 (1975).
53. See Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Found., 417 F.
Supp. 632 (1) and 417 F. Supp. 642 (II) (D.R.I. 1976).
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orientation is "inborn" "set at an early age" or a matter of"choice. ' 54 It is
simply not true that in America, civil rights law protects only groups defined by conditions which cannot be changed. We have a body of law forbidding discrimination against illegitimate children and one protecting
noncitizens. 5 5 Both of those conditions can be changed. It is not true that
civil rights law only protects groups defined by conditions they are born
with. We have laws banning discrimination based on marital status, a
choice made long after birth. 56 It is not true that civil rights law protects
only conditions which, if changeable, need to be changed by someone
other than a member of the group in question (the "uncontrollable" trait).
We do not allow discrimination on the basis of the most basic philosophical
57
choice, religious preference.
B. AIDS
There are two distinct arguments: first, that civil rights laws which
protect gay people will encourage the spread of the AIDS epidemic; second, that AIDS proves that gay people are not worthy of protection by civil
rights law.
Both arguments wrongly assume that all or most gay people have
AIDS. This simply is not true. In fact, some gay people (lesbians) are at a
lower risk than anyone else in society. 58 The first argument then compounds its error by assuming that all same sex sexual behavior spreads
AIDS. That of course is not true; anal intercourse without the use of condoms by persons already infected with the virus which causes AIDS is not
the only sexual activity of which gay people are capable. On the other
hand, it is true that heterosexual activities (including vaginal intercourse by
an infected person without a condom) can spread the disease and that nonsexual behavior (inoculation with infected blood) can spread it as well. 59
The argument's final assumption-that gay people who know about the
risks of AIDS will nonetheless continue to spread it-is quite wrong.
There are virtually no new AIDS infections among gay men in San Fran54. The notion that sexual orientation is purely a matter of choice seems unlikely to me,
as itdoes to most people who think of it in terms of their own sexual orientation.
55. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
56. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12940 (West 1980).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1981). Many states have similar laws.
58. As ofJune 1988, there were 64,506 AIDS cases in the United States. REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, U. S. Gov't

Printing Office (June 24, 1988) (popularly known as "The Watkins Report"). Using half the
usual estimate of 20,000,000 gay people in the U.S., the rate of infected gay people would be
just over one half of one percent. There has not been a single case of female to female sexual
transmission. See Francis, The Prevention of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the United States,

257 J.A.M.A. 1358 (1987).
59. See Francis, supra note 58.
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cisco. 60 When people learn about the disease and how to stop it from
spreading they do what is necessary. Civil rights protection for members
of the community most hurt by the disease will not change that.
Both of these arguments are really based on an unattractive desire to
punish the victims of this disease. Only a fool would think that being ravaged by an epidemic is evidence of a person's collective worth. It makes as
much sense to say that we should condemn all those who live on the gulf
61
coast for allowing themselves to be devastated by a hurricane.
C.

The Right to Discriminate.

Along with its philosophy of civil rights, America has a philosophy of
individual freedom. People ought to be free to associate with whomever
they wish, and free not to associate with whomever they wish to be apart
from.
Observing that many Americans believe in that kind of individual freedom does not help answer the question of whether there ought to be a
body of civil rights law protecting lesbians and gay men. All civil rights law
clashes with the notion of individual freedom. An employer may not refuse
to hire black people even though he or she wants nothing to do with them.
Landlords cannot refuse to rent to religious fundamentalists, no matter
how much they would prefer not to deal with them.
The issue is not whether Americans believe in a strong individual freedom to choose one's associates. The issue is when and where that value
must give way to the values represented by civil rights law. 62 That "freedom to choose" must give when it is directed against a group so victimized
by prejudice that its members cannot participate on the basis of merit in
what is supposed to be a merit system.
But the freedom to choose does not give way completely. No civil
rights law dictates who one might have to dinner, who one might marry, or
who one might share a beer with. Civil rights laws go no further than those
essentials of life: jobs, housing, businesses and political participation.
60. See Winkelstein, The San Francisco Men's Health Study: III. Reduction in Human Immu-

nodeficiency Virus Transmission among Homosexual/Bisexual Men, 1982-86, 76 AM. J. PuB.
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685, 688-89 (1987). See also Hessol, Seroconversion to HIV among Homosexual and Bisexual Men

Who Participatedin Hepatitis B Vaccine Trials, San Francisco Dep't of Public Health, AIDS Office
(1988).
61. After all, the gulf coast dwellers choose to live on the coast, and if they had heeded
history, they would have had more notice of the likely consequences of their lifestyle than
those infected with the AIDS virus before 1984 did. It is strange that those who see AIDS as a
reason to deny civil rights to gay people do not see it as a reason to deny civil rights to all but
gay people in those parts of the world where the disease has been primarily a heterosexual

problem.
62. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 541-44 (1987).
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FINAL WORD.

Civil rights law will not end prejudice against lesbians and gay men; it
will not even end discrimination. It will begin moving America a little
closer to what it aspires to be: a society committed to human rights and
devoted to justice.
Today we are ashamed of court decisions and laws which supported
slavery, which kept women away from the workplace, and which put Japanese Americans in concentration camps. We ought to be frightened, as
well as ashamed, for those laws and decisions which show how fragile our
commitment to fairness is. We are often comforted by the thought that
those were mistakes of the past.
But, just as it is a mistake to ascribe to the framers of the Constitution
a wisdom far beyond our own, it is a mistake to ascribe to the lawmakers of
the last two centuries an ignorance which we have outgrown. The blindness which was ours in 1789, in the 1840's and in the 1940's is still with us
today.
Every day that we allow lesbians and gay men to remain unprotected
by civil rights laws, we postpone any change of progress to greatness. We
should not wait another moment.

